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Abstract
We build on Shavell (1984)’s analysis of the optimal use of ex ante and ex
post interventions when a firm engages into activities potentially risky for the
environment or third-parties and has private information about the level of the
damage. The regulator enforces ex ante a standard of precautionary effort but
is uninformed about the harm level; ex post, in the event of an accident, the
judge may bring a lawsuit and discover the harm level. The social optimum can
be reached if, ex ante, the regulator offers the firm a menu of incentive contracts
(rewards, penalties and verifiable standards). When the precautionary effort is
no longer verifiable, the inefficiencies generated by the moral hazard incentive
problem cannot be circumvented.
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1 Introduction
Shavell (1984) provides a pioneering analysis of two distinct and often-encountered
instruments in environmental policies: ex ante regulation and ex post legal inter-
vention. Three actors are involved: a firm with limited assets which undertakes an
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environmentally risky activity, thereby potentially causing harm to third-parties; a
regulator, who intervenes ex ante and enforces a verifiable standard of precaution-
ary effort for the firm which affects the probability of an accident; a judge who may
impose a fine on the firm after an accident has occurred. Shavell shows that the opti-
mal regulation consists in setting a standard of care which equals the firm’s marginal
disutility with the expected damage. The benefit of using the judge comes from the
possibility of discovering the value of this damage when a legal suit is undertaken and
to improve incentives conditional on this event. We extend Shavell (1984)’s analysis
by allowing ex ante regulatory transfers which are socially costly. The first-best level
of care depends on the damage level and can now be easily implemented when care
is observable and a standard can be used. When care is non-observable, the opti-
mal precautionary care depends only on the expected damage and no longer on the
realized damage. It is no longer first-best.
2 Setting the stage
Consider a firm which undertakes a risky activity. The probability of an accident is
1− e where e is a precautionary effort exerted by the firm at a cost ψ(e) (ψ′, ψ′′ > 0).
In the event of an accident, third-parties suffer from a damage whose magnitude is
h. Possible levels of the damage belong to [h, h]. The first-best effort level depends
on the size of the damage and is given by ψ′(e∗(h)) = h. At the margin, the optimal
effort level must trade off the gain associated with a smaller accident probability,
and consequently a lower expected damage on third-parties, with a larger cost of
precaution for the firm.
Assume that the firm has limited assets y < h and is privately informed about
h. When an accident occurs, the judge engages a lawsuit against the firm with an
exogenous probability given by q ∈ [0, 1]. The judge will be able to discover h only
if a lawsuit is engaged. The regulator can enforce a given standard of precautionary
effort s. In this context, Shavell (1984) studies the joint use of regulation and liability
by a merged regulatory entity. Since ex ante transfers to the firm are ruled out, the
merged entity obtains information on harm only when an ex post intervention is used
and an ex ante standard is useful otherwise. The level of care depends then on h only
because of the ex post intervention. With ex ante transfers, we show that the only
role for the judge is to make incentives to reveal information on h strict when care
is observable and a standard can be used. Using the judge is irrelevant when care is
non-observable. In this case, the optimal regulatory policy cannot be contingent on
the level of harm.
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3 Observable precautionary effort
Invoking the Revelation Principle, there is no loss of generality in restricting the
merged entity to offer a direct and truthful menu of contracts to the privately in-
formed firm. This menu consists of a standard s(hˆ), a transfer in case of an accident
(respectively, no accident) ta(hˆ) (respectively, tn(hˆ)), which all depend on the firm’s
announcement hˆ of the value of the damage. This contract also stipulates a penalty
R(hˆ, h) if the firm has announced ex ante hˆ to the regulator and the judge discovers
ex post that the true damage is h (with R(h, h) = 0).1
The following incentive constraints must thus hold: for all pairs (h, hˆ)
U(h, h) ≡ s(h)tn(h) + (1− s(h))ta(h)− ψ(s(h)) ≥
U(hˆ, h) ≡ s(hˆ)tn(hˆ) + (1− s(hˆ))
[
(1− q)ta(hˆ) + q
(
ta(hˆ)−R(hˆ, h)
)]
− ψ(s(hˆ)).
(IC)
Given the restricted liability of the firm, the following limited liability constraints
have to be satisfied by the contract: for all pairs (h, hˆ)
ta(hˆ)−R(hˆ, h) ≥ −y, (LL1)
ta(hˆ), tn(hˆ) ≥ −y. (LL2)
Finally, the firm accepts the contract if its individual rationality constraints are
satisfied: for all pairs (h, h)
U(h, h) ≥ 0. (IR)
The regulator’s objective2 −(1 − s(h))h − s(h)tn(h) − (1 − s(h))ta(h) = −(1 −
s(h))h−ψ(s(h))−U(h, h) is maximized when the firm receives no rent (i.e., U(h, h) =
0) and the standard is set at the first-best level of care, i.e., s∗(h) = e∗(h).
To relax incentive constraints under asymmetric information on h, the penalty
R(hˆ, h) should be set at the highest value consistent with the limited liability con-
straints of the firm: (LL1) is binding at equilibrium. Is it possible to implement the
socially optimal standard while leaving the firm with no rent and ensuring incentive
compatibility? This amounts to finding a set of transfers such that, for all h
s∗(h)tn(h) + (1− s∗(h))ta(h)− ψ(s∗(h)) = 0, (1)
s∗(h)tn(h) + (1− s∗(h)) [(1− q)ta(h)− qy]− ψ(s∗(h)) ≤ 0, (2)
ta(h), tn(h) ≥ −y. (3)
1This game features adverse selection with ex post arrival of correlated information, as studied
in Riordan and Sappington (1988), with the following differences: the probability of occurrence of
the ex post information depends on the contract itself and, more importantly, the adverse selection
parameter h does not affect directly the firm’s utility.
2Note that regulatory transfers are costly.
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Simple algebra reveals that such transfers always exist. Indeed, taking into account
that (1) holds, the incentive constraint (2) becomes q(1 − s∗(h)) [ta(h) + y] ≥ 0 and
it is implied by (3).
To explain this result, consider first the case of regulation alone, i.e., q = 0. In
this case, the true harm level is never discovered ex post. However, the regulator
can offer a menu of contracts such that, for each possible value of h, the standard
is first-best and the transfers ta(h) and tn(h) are such that U(h, h) = 0. Faced with
this menu, the firm knowing h is exactly indifferent between announcing h or hˆ 6= h
to the regulator since in both cases it gets no rent. This stems from the fact that the
firm’s private information does not enter directly into its objective function but only
indirectly through the mechanism offered by the regulator. If this indifference could
be broken in favor of the regulator, then there would be no gain to complement ex
ante regulation with ex post liability rules. The joint use of ex ante regulation and
ex post liability ensures that the firm has a strict incentive to reveal its information.
Then, (2) is a strict inequality. Indeed, if it lies, the firm runs the risk of being caught
ex post if a lawsuit is engaged and the true harm level is revealed.3
4 Unobservable precautionary effort
Consider now that, on top of the adverse selection incentive problem, the joint entity
cannot observe the precautionary effort, which is now chosen by the firm in order
to maximize its utility. No standard can be imposed because care is non-observable.
In a truthful equilibrium, the following (first-order) moral hazard constraint must be
satisfied
tn(h)− ta(h) = ψ′(e(h)), (4)
where e(.) denotes now the effort level. When the firm has enough wealth (typically
y > h¯), the regulator overcomes the moral hazard problem by creating sufficiently
large a wedge between the transfers in the event of an accident and of no accident.
Neither the nonobservability of the precautionary effort nor the adverse selection
problem create inefficiencies.4
However, when y < h, the limited wealth constraint always binds and ta(h) = −y.5
Ex post legal intervention turns out to be useless. In the event of an accident, which
occurs with probability 1−e(hˆ), ta(hˆ) = −y and thus R(hˆ, h) = 0 so that the firm not
revealing truthfully its information earns (1−q)ta(hˆ)+q[ta(hˆ)−R(hˆ, h)] = −y, which
no longer depends on the probability of the judge’s intervention. The regulator must
3Note that it is possible for the regulator to offer the firm a transfer only if there is no accident
or only when an accident has occurred.
4The proof of this statement is immediate and left to the reader.
5It is standard to show that this is the relevant limited liability constraint.
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now give to the firm a socially costly liability rent U(h) ≡ −y+e(h)ψ′(e(h))−ψ(e(h))
to induce care. The regulator can no longer choose transfers so that adverse selection
incentive compatibility constraints are satisfied at no cost. The adverse selection
constraint writes indeed as U(h) ≥ U(hˆ) for all pairs (h, hˆ). This implies that the
same level of rent must be given to the firm6 whatever its information on the damage,
and that tn(h) (and thus s(h) from (4)) are independent of h.
Regulatory transfers are used to induce the firm to internalize the effects of its
actions and to partially realign the social and private incentives but do not allow for
information revelation.
In this context, moral hazard truly magnifies the adverse selection problem and
leads to socially costly inefficiencies. Under moral hazard for the precautionary effort
and adverse selection on the harm level, no information revelation occurs and ex post
intervention is useless. The effort level ep induced by an optimal regulation with ex
ante transfers depends only on the expected damage:
E(h) = ψ′(ep) + epψ”(ep). (5)
5 References
Lewis, T. and D. Sappington, 2000, “Contracting with Wealth-Constrained
Agents”, International Economic Review, 41: 743-767.
Riordan, M. and D. Sappington, 1988, “Optimal Contracts with Public
Ex Post Information”, Journal of Economic Theory, 45: 189-199.
Shavell, S., 1984, “A Model of the Optimal Use of Liability and Safety
Regulation”, RAND Journal of Economics, 15: 271-280.
6See Lewis and Sappington (2000) for a related model.
5
